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Overview 
Australians pay far too much for superannuation. They pay about 
$20 billion in fees and expenses in total. Fund customers pay 
$1300 on average, every year. These payments to the 
superannuation industry can and should be reduced by at least 
half, saving Australians at least $10 billion a year. It is the largest 
single opportunity for micro-economic reform in the economy. 
High fees hurt account holders. They reduce the amount of 
superannuation at retirement by more than 20 per cent. High fees 
mean that on conservative assumptions a 50-year old Australian 
will have his or her super balance reduced by over $80,000 in 
fees  (in  today’s  dollars)  at  retirement.  A  30-year old will lose more 
than $250,000, or over a quarter of the total balance. Under a 
fairer fee structure, at least half that money could be saved. 
High fees also hurt taxpayers, who pay more for pensions when 
superannuation runs short. High fees are not justified by high 
returns: Australian funds that charge the highest fees consistently 
deliver lower returns than others once their fees are taken out.  
Other countries show that superannuation can be managed at 
much lower cost. Australian funds charge fees that are three 
times the median OECD rate, on average. Many countries have 
superannuation  pools  much  smaller  than  Australia’s,  yet  their  
funds charge customers much less. 
Costs are too high in Australia because the system assumes that 
account holders will make choices that will generate pressure for 
lower fees. Yet this approach has not worked for decades, nor 
has it worked overseas. Superannuation is inherently opaque, and 
few people can make or care to make an informed choice. 
Some  argue  that  the  complexity  of  Australia’s  superannuation  
regulations increases the cost of the system. If this is true, it 
exposes an urgent need to reduce regulation. Yet the wide 
variation in the fees charged by funds suggests that 
superannuation businesses are choosing to charge higher fees.  
Recent reforms will not help much. MySuper — a more uniform 
set of products for people who do not actively choose their funds 
— makes funds somewhat easier to compare, but does little to 
increase the pressure on fees. SuperStream, a package of 
administrative reforms, will reduce some costs, but does nothing 
to address the costs of marketing, sales or asset management. 
Overseas, the best superannuation systems establish tenders for 
the right to run the best-priced default fund — one that most 
employees,  who  don’t  manage  their  own  accounts, automatically 
pay into. The Australian system should follow suit. Government 
should select a small number of default funds every few years 
with a tender based on fees. Unless they opt out, all new job 
starters would pay into these funds. 
Second, to push down fees for existing accounts, tax time — from 
the end of June — should also be superannuation choice time. A 
new step in the tax return process should enable taxpayers to 
compare their current fund with the low-cost winners of the default 
tender. 
These reforms may reduce the revenues of superannuation funds. 
More importantly, they will reduce the unpleasant sting of high 
fees on the superannuation balances of Australians. 
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1. Australia’s  high  super  fees  are  hurting  retirement 
Australian superannuation fees are higher than those in most 
other OECD countries, and much higher than those in other 
systems of similar size. As the Australian system has expanded, 
fees charged to account holders have remained high, not fallen as 
would be expected in an industry with economies of scale. 
Australian superannuation fees, and the expenses reported by 
funds, have long been above the OECD median expense ratio, as 
Figure 1 shows.1 Australian fund expenses hardly moved over the 
last decade. Average fees have dropped slightly — from about 
1.38 per cent in 2002 to 1.19 per cent in 2013 — mostly because 
higher-fee retail funds have lost share to self-managed funds.2 
Yet at that pace it will be 50 years before Australia attains even 
the median expenses achieved today by funded pension systems 
in OECD countries. 
 
                                            
1 Fees exceed reported expenses on average because some funds earn profit, 
pay commissions, or incur other costs. Australian expenses include some costs 
relating to the administration of insurance not incurred by some other systems. 
Industry  sources  suggest  they  could  be  as  much  as  ⅓  of  administrative  
expenses or around 0.1 per cent of funds under management (FUM) per year.  
2 Rainmaker Information (2013), p. 5. 
Figure 1: The cost of running the Australian superannuation 
system is much higher than the OECD average 
Superannuation fees and expenses, per cent of funds under 
management, annual 
 
Note: Australian expense ratios are the costs reported by APRA-regulated funds, divided 
by the value of the assets they manage. Fees are the list charges incurred by account 
holders. The OECD expense ratio is the median of the average expense ratio for funded 
pension systems (including defined-benefit and defined-contribution). 
Source: Expense ratios: OECD.Stat (2014a), APRA (2014a), Fees in 2012-13: Grattan 
analysis of  APRA (2014a), SuperRatings (2014); Rice Warner (2012) for fees 2002-2011. 
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Other countries with large retirement savings systems have much 
lower operating expenses (Figure 2). That is usually the case with 
large systems. But some systems overseas are a tenth of the size 
of  Australia’s  yet  run  on  about  half  the  expense.3 
Total funds managed in the Australian system grew from around 
$600 billion in 2004 to around $1.7 trillion today.4 Individual 
superannuation funds grew even faster, as many funds merged or 
closed. The average fund today manages $4.2 billion, up from 
$700 million in 2004 (in 2013 dollars).5  
A larger system of larger funds should incur lower costs and 
charge lower fees, because big funds have lower costs. 
Accordingly, by 2013 the sixfold increase in average scale should 
have delivered cost reductions of over 20 per cent, worth almost 
$2 billion a year.  
But even as the system more than doubled in real terms and the 
average fund grew sixfold over the last decade, fees have only 
declined modestly and expense ratios hardly changed. The scale 
dividend has been fully absorbed by cost increases: the cost of 
managing a superannuation fund of a given size has increased by 
about 20 per cent over the last decade in real terms (Figure 3). 
 
                                            
3 ‘Defined  Contribution’  (DC)  systems  typically  report  higher  expenses  than  
‘Defined  Benefit’  (DB)  systems,  because  DB  systems  have  less  account  
reporting complexity and usually fewer investment products. But several defined 
contribution systems also achieve lower expenses. 
4 ABS (2014b). 
5 APRA-regulated funds only - excludes self-managed funds. 
Figure 2: Australia’s  superannuation  system expenses exceed 
others of similar scale 
Funded pension expense, per cent of funds under management, annual 
 
 
Note:  Year:  2012  or  latest  prior  to  2012.  For  the  purpose  of  this  chart  ‘defined  benefit’  is  a  
system where greater than 60% of assets are in defined benefit plans; others are allocated 
to defined contribution. The chart includes 22 countries, the US Thrift Savings Plan (the 
defined contribution fund for US public servants) and the Swedish private pension system. 
See Appendix 3 for a version of this chart with countries identified.   
Source: Thrift Savings Plan (2014), Swedish Pensions Agency (2013), Swedish Pensions 
Agency (2014a); OECD.Stat (2014a); OECD.Stat (2014b); OECD (2013). 
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Figure 3: The superannuation cost curve has shifted up 
Expenses, per cent of funds under management, annual, 2004 & 2013 
 
Note:  Results of semilog regressions on APRA expense data. A doubling of funds under 
management reduces expenses by around 0.08 to 0.1 per cent of the funds under 
management. The 2013 and 2014 results are statistically significantly different. 2004 funds 
under management converted to 2013 dollars using the consumer price inflator. 
Source: APRA (2014a) 
Account holders now pay much more than they did a decade ago, 
because accounts grew and fees did not fall much. Expenses per 
account holder rose by 50 per cent, from $550 in 2004, to $820 in 
2013 (in 2013 dollars and excluding self-managed funds). Fees 
per account holder rose by 51 per cent, from about $870 in 2004 
to over $1300 in 2013 (also in 2013 dollars, excluding self-
managed funds). 
1.1 High fees reduce net returns in Australia 
High fees would not be a concern if Australians were getting value 
for money. But high fee funds are damaging our retirement 
savings. This section highlights the impact of fees using four 
different analyses.  
First, it examines the impact of fees on retirement balances that 
can be expected from reasonable assumptions about returns and 
wage  growth.  They  imply  that  Australia’s  current  average  fees  
reduce retirement balances by over 20 per cent, compared to a 
notional system that charges zero fees.  
Second, it reviews average fees and returns in superannuation 
over the last decade. Fees consumed more than a quarter of 
gross superannuation earnings over that period.  
Third, it examines whether, in practice, high fee funds destroy 
value or earn their keep. High-fee funds do indeed destroy 
returns: on average, high-fee funds do not generate higher gross 
returns and so generate much lower returns after fees than low 
fee funds. Fees charged by the more expensive funds absorbed 
well over half of gross earnings.  
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
$50m $2bn $10bn $30bn 
Fund size 
Cost in 2004 
Cost in 2013 
There is scale in superannuation; costs at each scale have risen 
Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much for superannuation 
Grattan Institute 2014 8 
Fourth, it examines whether fees or past performance are a better 
predictor of future performance. Low fees are the best guide to 
subsequent performance. Over the decade, the lowest-fee funds 
went on to earn returns that strongly exceeded not only those of 
the average fund but even the returns of funds that had previously 
performed best.  
First, how big an impact can fees be expected to make on 
retirement balances? The precise impact depends on returns and 
income growth, but fees can make the difference between steak 
and spaghetti in retirement. Realistic assumptions imply that an 
apparently modest fee of one per cent every year accumulated 
over a working life — lower than the average Australian fee — 
can be expected to reduce retirement income by more than 20 per 
cent, as Figure 4 shows. A two per cent fee can be expected to 
reduce balances at retirement by almost forty per cent. 
Another way to see the impact of fees is to consider how much 
they will reduce retirement balances for people at different career 
stages today (Figure 5). The impact of fees will be higher for 
younger workers as they will be part of the super system for 
longer. For someone aged 61 in 2010, and retiring at 65 in 2014 
after a lifetime on median earnings, the average current fees of 
1.2 per cent per year will have reduced their superannuation 
balances by about $12,000, or 11 per cent. For someone aged 45 
in 2010, fees of 1.2 per cent per year can be expected to reduce 
their balances at retirement by around $80,000 in 2010 dollars, or 
20 per cent. For someone entering the workforce at 25 in 2010, 
fees of 1.2 per cent per year can be expected reduce their 
retirement balances by over $250,000 or 27 per cent.  
Figure 4: Even apparently small fees strongly reduce retirement 
balances 
Retirement balances relative to fund with zero fees, per cent 
 
Note: Reduction in balance at retirement, assuming a 40-year contribution period, real 
wage growth of 1.8 per cent p.a., and real portfolio returns of 5 per cent. The assumptions 
and results used here are close to those used in OECD (2012). 
Source: Grattan modelling based on the parameters used to construct Table 6.3 in OECD 
(2012). 
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Figure 5: Cumulative impact of fees will be high for those starting 
work now 
Balances at retirement before and after fees, thousands of 2013 dollars 
 
Note: Fees of 1.2 per cent per annum paid over a working life. Superannuation balances 
accumulated at the Superannuation Guarantee rate applying in each year. Assumes actual 
real mean weekly earnings growth before 2010, and real wage growth of 1.4 per cent 
thereafter; age-specific earnings from the ABS Household Expenditure Survey. Real gross 
portfolio returns assumed at 5 per cent. 
Source: Grattan modelling; ABS (2011).   
The impact of fees can also be seen in total Australian 
superannuation returns. From 2004 to 2013, fees consumed more 
than a quarter of gross earnings on superannuation balances 
invested from the start of the period (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Fees have absorbed over a quarter of returns since 2004 
Annual real returns to superannuation, term deposits and equities: 2004 
to 2013, per cent 
 
Note: Term deposits are the compounded returns of 3-year term deposits from July 2003 to 
July 2013, after 15 per cent annual tax as for superannuation. Superannuation is the 
compounded net return of APRA-monitored funds over the same period. Net 
superannuation returns are post-tax. Tax rates applicable to superannuation funds are 
lower than the corporate rate (10 per cent for capital gains, and 15 per cent for income). 
ASX 200 returns are the annualised returns of the S&P ASX 200 Net Total Returns Index 
over the same period. The index is post-tax (at rates applicable as withholding tax from the 
perspective of a non-tax-treaty country: unfranked dividends 30%; interest 10%; royalties 
30%). 
Source: APRA (2014a); S&P (2014); RBA (2014).  
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A dollar invested with the average fund from 2004 to 2013 earned 
returns averaging 4.25 per cent a year, before fees and after 
adjusting for inflation. Fees reduced these returns to just 3 per 
cent. After fees and taxes, superannuation on average has 
returned somewhat higher returns than the return on the longest-
available term deposits (taxed as if it were in superannuation), 
and well below the ASX 200 before tax (except international 
withholding tax). Over time, superannuation returns are sure to 
vary. But fees are a constant and substantial drag on returns. 
Across the superannuation system in the decade from 2004 to 
2013 (excluding the self-managed sector), gross earnings before 
fees were $378 billion in 2013 dollars. Fees reduced net earnings 
by $158 billion, over 40 per cent of gross earnings, to just $220 
billion (Figure 7).  
Fees reduced balances by more than the sum of fees paid, 
because fees paid along the way are not available for re-
investment. Over a period when returns are low, the foregone 
investment income is low. But over a lifetime, it can add up to 
around half of the total burden of fees. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Over the decade to 2013, fees reduced superannuation 
balances by $158b 
Superannuation balances, contributions, earnings and fees, 2004-2013 
Billions of 2013 dollars 
 
Note:  Initial and terminal balances are from the aggregate APRA fund-level dataset 
(including self-managed funds) and scaled to 2013 dollars using the CPI (ABS, 2014). 
Fees are fund-weighted averages Rice Warner (2012) for 2004 – 2005, and SuperRatings 
(2014) for 2006-2013, applied to real funds under management at the midpoint of each 
year. Impact of fees includes foregone accumulation. Gross earnings are estimated by 
adding fees to the net FUM-weighted average rates of return from the APRA dataset. 
Source: APRA (2014a) (initial and end balances, contributions, net earnings), Rice Warner 
(2012) & SuperRatings (2014) (fees). 
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Third, do high-fee funds earn their keep? The high fees charged 
by some funds would be harmless if these funds earned returns 
that more than paid for their fees, or were better at managing risk 
than their cheaper counterparts. But there is strong evidence that 
high fee funds do not earn their keep. The average high-fee fund 
earns much lower net returns and does not reduce investment 
risks.6 
Figure 8 shows real net returns, fees and gross returns from 2006 
to 2013. Funds are allocated to 10 groups, ranked by the fees 
they charge. Average fees charged in each group range from 
about 0.5 to over 2.5 per cent a year. The chart shows that fees 
sharply reduce net returns: the lowest-fee group of funds earned 
almost three per cent a year, while the highest fee group earned 
just under zero. In other words, an extra dollar of fees reduces 
returns by slightly more than a dollar: more expensive funds tend 
to earn less even before fees are deducted.7 
                                            
6 See Appendix 2 for analysis of the risk-return profile of Australian 
superannuation funds.  
7 There are two reasons. First, high-fee and low-fee funds have tended to invest 
in different asset classes. Industry funds tend to charge lower fees than retail 
funds and also had higher exposures to two asset classes that performed well 
over the period: unlisted property and infrastructure. Second, higher-fee funds 
with exposures to equities are more likely to use active investment management 
(that is, the asset managers may buy individual stocks or asset classes they 
expect to rise in price). Active asset managers tend to incur transaction costs 
related to frequent buying and selling of assets. In Australia, stated pre-fee 
“gross  returns”  for  funds  are  in  reality  net  of  these  unreported  costs.  Unreported  
transaction costs have been estimated as 0.23 per cent per year (see Sy and Liu 
(2010)) and as well over 1 per cent per year (as in Bogle (2014)). 
Figure 8: High-fee funds generate lower net returns 
Real annual returns across funds, grouped by fee decile, 2006-2013 
 
Note: Returns are deflated by consumer price index. Fees are asset-weighted product fees 
at the fund level. Excludes self-managed funds.  
Source: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a), SuperRatings (2014). 
Fourth, are fees or previous returns the best guide to future 
returns? Fees are the best available predictor of future returns — 
even better than choosing a fund based on its historical 
performance.  
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Figure 9 shows the subsequent performance of three groups of 
funds — low-fee funds, previously high performing funds, and all 
funds — over the period 2007 to 2013. The returns of low-fee 
funds exceeded the returns of the average fund by 0.8 per cent a 
year. They also exceeded the returns of the previously highest-
performing funds by 0.35 per cent a year. While superannuation 
account holders would do better than average if they chose a fund 
that had previously delivered high net returns, they would perform 
better still if they simply chose a superannuation fund with low 
fees.8  
Fees are responsible for much of the strong performance of the 
group that previously attained high returns, as can be seen from 
the fee numbers along the base of Figure 9.   
Others have also found that fees are critical to superannuation 
returns. In 2012, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA) summarised its research on investment performance and 
costs.  APRA’s  head  of  research  wrote:  
Individual fund managers and individual asset classes may 
outperform others, but these effects are transient. Costs, on 
the other hand, are persistent. Between a strategy of pursuing 
gross returns and a strategy of minimising the difference 
between gross and net returns, the latter appears more 
fruitful.”9 
                                            
8 See Appendix 2 for a more detailed analysis.  
9 Arnold (2012). 
Figure 9: Low fees are a better guide to future returns than are 
previous returns 
Subsequent net real annual returns of funds based on previous fees and 
previous returns. 2006-2013, per cent, annual 
 
Note: In each year in the sample from 2006 to 2011, three sets of funds are compiled. The 
first are the 10 per cent of funds with the lowest fees. The second are the 10 per cent 
whose historical returns (for history back to 2004) are highest. The third is all funds. The 
orange bars indicate the average of the subsequent returns for all decision years. 
Source: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a) & SuperRatings (2014).  
Appendix 2 provides a more detailed discussion of how fees have 
affected returns in Australian superannuation funds over the last 
decade. 
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2. Why Australian superannuation fees are high 
Fees in Australia are high for one main reason. The system relies 
on account-holders and employers to put pressure on fees, but 
many do not. While some account holders do pay attention to 
fees, because they tend to buy different products, such as those 
designed for people with large accounts, they put relatively little 
fee pressure on other products.  
As a result, funds do not compete primarily on fees. Instead, they 
tend to compete on the basis of marketing campaigns, sales and 
distribution networks, member engagement services and on the 
breadth of their product ranges and investment options.  
All these forms of non-fee competition cost money, which is 
passed on as fees. They do little to help account holders to 
understand what drives their long-run returns. The system 
remains inefficient and opaque, even as high fees erode account 
holders’  net  returns. The lack of fee pressure also allows other 
inefficiencies to persist.10 
2.1 Many account holders are disengaged and do not focus 
on fees 
Many Australians are not well informed about their 
superannuation or the fees they pay. Many do not actively select 
their fund, and very few switch funds except when they switch 
jobs. Many others who are more actively engaged in 
                                            
10 Inefficiencies such as small funds, small tranches of assets under 
management, and manual handling of transactions are not rapidly removed 
when firms do not face intense fee competition.  
superannuation make poor decisions because they focus on 
measures other than fees. 
Figure 10 summarises the findings of three surveys of what 
people know about their superannuation and how involved they 
are. About half of account holders do not know the fees they pay. 
Three-quarters do not know their investment returns.  
Less than a third of people choose their own fund. A survey 
commissioned for the Australian Tax Office found that 69 per cent 
of people did not choose their own fund when they joined their 
most recent employer. 11  Similarly, an Australian Bureau of 
Statistics study found that 70 per cent of individuals have their 
primary superannuation with an employer-nominated fund. Of 
these, about two-thirds play no role in selecting their fund or 
product.12 Other studies put the proportion of employees who play 
no role in selecting a superannuation fund at 80 per cent.13 
Finally, very few people – about 2 per cent of Australians with a 
superannuation account, at most – switched funds in 2013 for 
reasons other than switching jobs or their employer switching 
default funds.14  
                                            
11 Colmar Brunton (2010b). 
12 ABS (2009).  
13 See sources cited in Commonwealth of Australia (2010b), Endnote 4, p 36. 
Some of these studies appear to assume that being in a default product entails 
not having exercised any choice. 
14 3-9 per cent (Colmar Brunton (2010b), Roy Morgan (2013)) switch 
superannuation funds in each year. Around 80 per cent of them switch funds 
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Of those who actively choose a fund, many say they seek to 
minimise fees. When asked what mattered in their choice of 
superannuation funds, 68 per cent said low fees and 62 per cent 
said high or strong investment returns.15 Nevertheless, the 
surveys show that in reality very few know, compare, or act on the 
fees they pay. 
There is also a wide array of evidence that many account holders 
under-value the importance of fees and do not respond much to 
fees. As one recent  study  puts  it,  “underweighting  of  fees  is  
pervasive and sticky, robust to demographic variation and investor 
experience.”16 Unresponsiveness to fees is commonly found in 
studies of Australian and other account holders.17  There may be 
several reasons why. Individuals may find it hard to compare 
superannuation funds because they do not understand the 
financial basics that are needed to make a wise choice of fund.18 
They may also defer decisions that affect their future wellbeing. 
                                                                                    
because they change jobs or their employers change funds providers 
(Commonwealth of Australia (2010a)). 
15 Colmar Brunton (2010b) 
16 Fisch and Wilkinson-Ryan (2013). 
17 Langford, et al. (2006), Choi, et al. (2010); references cited on p.4 and p.5 of 
Calderón-Colín, et al. (2008). 
18 Worthington (2008), Agarwal, et al. (2009); Capuano and Ramsay (2011); 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011); Fisch and Wilkinson-Ryan (2013); Bateman, et al. 
(2014)  
Figure 10: Few account holders are well-informed and fewer 
actively switch funds 
Survey  findings  on  superannuation  account  holders’  knowledge  and  
action on their accounts, per cent of respondents 
 
Source: Q1: Financial Services Council and ING Direct (2013), Q2-3:Colmar Brunton 
(2010b), Q4: Colmar Brunton (2010b), Commonwealth of Australia (2010a).  
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2.2 Many employers are disengaged and do not focus on 
fees 
Employers play an important role in selecting default funds. Many 
of them are no more engaged or informed about superannuation 
than are their employees. Some may select funds that offer a 
broad range of options at high cost to employees. Some may 
consider their own costs and benefits before benefits for their 
staff. 
Many employers are poorly informed about the performance and 
fees of the default funds they have selected on behalf of their 
employees. In a survey commissioned by the ATO, 49 per cent of 
employers reported very little or no knowledge of their default 
fund’s  investment  performance  over  the  last  year (Figure 11). 
Only 25 per cent said they had compared the investment 
performance of the employer-nominated default fund, and about 
30 per cent said they had compared the fees with those of other 
funds. Of all employers interviewed, only 7 per cent had ever 
switched their default fund. 
Figure 11: Few employers are well informed or active in selecting 
default funds 
Employer knowledge of and action on the funds they nominate for 
employees, per cent of respondents 
  
 
Source: Colmar Brunton (2010a). 
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Employers may also be motivated to select a superannuation 
provider that offers a wide range of investment options to their 
employees, even though products with many investment options 
typically charge high fees.19 Some employers may also select 
providers for reasons other than the best interests of their 
employees. Eleven per cent of large employers and four per cent 
of smaller ones report that the funds they chose had offered them 
incentives. 20 While incentives in the form of lower superannuation 
fees are in the interests of employees, some employers also said 
they had received offers of discounts on non-superannuation 
financial products such as credit cards and home loans.21 The 
head of one bank-owned superannuation fund has noted that it is 
convenient for companies to have various services supplied by 
the  one  bank  because  “it  makes  relationship  management  
seamless”.22 While efficient banking and superannuation 
relationships are a good thing, employers may in some instances 
pay more attention to their overall banking relationship than to the 
value-for-money of the superannuation fund that comes with that 
relationship. 
2.3 Pressure from fee-sensitive customers has not cut fees 
much for others  
Superannuation is simple in principle. It should offer exposure to 
assets that provide a good basis for accumulation of funds as the 
account holder nears retirement. Yet superannuation has come to 
                                            
19Rainmaker Information (2013), p. 8 
20 More than 100 staff. 
21 Colmar Brunton (2010a) 
22 Patten (2014) 
be sold as a broad range of superficially differentiated products. 
There are hundreds of funds, most offering multiple products that 
are sold directly to customers -- via telephone or the web, for 
example -- or via distribution networks such as bank branches 
and financial advisers. Some funds offer few investment options, 
others many. Funds charge fees in diverse ways, including fees 
upon entry and exit, and ongoing annual fees charged as flat 
dollar amounts and as a percentage of account value. They offer 
different online and other service options.   
Such broad choice can benefit active and engaged account 
holders, and indeed, some look for and find lower superannuation 
fees. Others -- typically those with larger balances -- may find it 
beneficial to set up a self-managed fund. Some large firms may 
negotiate discounts, while workers in the public sector or in some 
industry funds also pay low fees.  
But such product and price dispersion also separates fee-
sensitive customers from the many who are disengaged. 
Disengaged customers get little, if any, benefit from pressure 
exerted by fee-sensitive shoppers. Those who have smaller 
balances, or whose employers choose a high-fee fund, or who 
simply do not appreciate the importance of fees can end up 
paying fees that are far too high. 
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Figure 12 shows that fees differ markedly. Many funds – mostly 
industry funds – charge fees at just under 1 per cent. The fees of 
retail funds range from around 1 to well over 2 per cent a year. 
Fees of individual products and investment options – not shown in 
the chart – vary even more. 
Average fees have fallen modestly because in the mid-2000s 
higher-fee retail funds lost a few percentage points of market 
share to lower-fee self-managed and industry funds.23 The rapid 
growth in the self-managed sector, where expenses are estimated 
to be in the range of 0.85-1.00 per cent per year, is a case in 
point.24 People with larger balances effectively opt-out of the 
choice market, leaving behind less fee-sensitive account holders. 
                                            
23 “In  the  past  5  years,  the  proportion  of  superannuation  funds  under  
management in the not for profit sector increased slightly from 36% to 38% and 
the proportion in the SMSF sector increased from 29% to 33%, while the 
proportion  in  the  retail  sector  has  fallen  from  35%  to  29%.”  Rainmaker 
Information (2013) 
24 Rice Warner (2012), Table 3 p. 8 estimates fees in 2011 at 1.00 per cent; 
Rainmaker Information (2013) Figure 3, p. 5 estimates them at 0.83 in 2011 and 
0.85 in 2013. 
Figure 12: There is a broad range of superannuation fees 
Fee range in superannuation, 2013; funds under management at each 
fee level 
 
Note: Fees recorded for public sector and some corporate funds may not include all 
relevant costs as some are paid by the employer. Excludes some smaller products offering 
a broad range of investment options. Excludes self-managed superannuation funds. 
Source: Grattan analysis of SuperRatings (2014) (fee) and APRA (2014a) (FUM) data. For 
the past decade fees have remained highly differentiated.25 Industry fund fees have risen 
slightly; fees on simpler retail products have fallen slightly, and risen on other retail 
products.  
                                            
25  Rainmaker Information (2013). 
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2.4 Inattention to fees has permitted costs to grow largely 
unchecked 
The inattention of many account holders to fees has driven 
providers to seek to differentiate themselves with a range of 
diverse products and services. They have developed sales and 
distribution activities to capture and protect profitable market 
share. They have developed a range of product and service 
features such as platforms that provide a broad range of 
investment options.  
All these features drive up costs and fees. Competition on these 
features, rather than on fees, does not remove other inefficiencies 
such as excess pay, manual processes or overly active 
management of funds that further reduce net returns.  
Funds bear the costs of distribution, sales, marketing and product 
differentiation.26 These costs make sense for each fund but they 
hurt the net returns of investors. Funds report that marketing and 
distribution costs are about 7 per cent of total costs, though some 
commission costs appear to be omitted from APRA reporting.27   
But the full costs of product differentiation and member 
engagement must be much higher than the reported cost of 
marketing and distribution alone. They would include many of the 
capital and operational costs of engaging members, creating 
product ranges and providing a choice platform that allows 
consumers to make decisions about where their money is 
                                            
26 Williams (2014) 
27 Arnold (2012) 
invested. These costs are not reported separately but constitute a 
large fraction of the non-investment costs of super funds.  
Funds also incur substantial costs when they actively manage 
their asset portfolio – in other words, when they move assets 
around in search of the best returns. Many Australian pension 
funds do this despite strong evidence that passively managed 
assets perform better in most asset classes. Active management 
drags down returns by incurring explicit costs for research, 
analysis and other services. In addition, the (unreported) costs of 
churn – the fact that the buy price of an asset is always higher 
than its sale price – have been estimated at between 0.23 and 1 
per cent a year.28  
Some funds incur other costs that further reduce net returns. 
Some retail trustees use related-party administrators and pay 
higher fees.29 In some cases, there is evidence that fee 
negotiations do not extract reasonably expected value from 
external asset managers.30  
As a result of all these factors, non-fee competition over the last 
decade has largely absorbed benefits from improvements in 
technology and scale. As Figure 3 in Section 0 shows, the 
anticipated scale advantage has not materialised even as the 
average size of a superannuation fund increased sixfold over the 
decade to 2013. Firms have incurred additional expenses that 
almost exactly consumed the scale dividend.
                                            
28 Sy, et al. (2009); Sy and Liu (2010); Bogle (2014)  
29 Liu and Arnold (2010) 
30 Sy and Liu (2010) 
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3. Why Stronger Super will not lower fees much 
Announcing the Stronger Super reforms in 2011, the Government 
predicted that they would reduce the average fees paid by 
members by up to 40 per cent, or around 0.5 per cent of funds 
under management a year.31  But fee cuts of that size do not 
appear at all likely.  
The reforms (see box) will modestly reduce costs and make 
products somewhat more comparable. But the reforms do little to 
shift the basis of competition towards fees. Widespread 
disengagement by both employees and employers is likely to 
persist. The product segmentation that prevents existing fee 
competition for engaged account holders from driving down fees 
for others is also likely to persist. 
The early signs of reform do not suggest a new age of fee 
competition: available data show no signs of reduced fees. And 
while some retail funds have brought new, low-fee products to 
market, some have grandfathered products, closing them to new 
members, so that less engaged account holders continue to be 
charged higher fees.  Stronger Super leaves Australia a long way 
from systems overseas that have delivered low fees. 
 
                                            
31 Commonwealth of Australia (2011), p.1. 
The Stronger Super reforms  
The Stronger Super reforms, which are being phased in until 2017 
after passing into law in phases from 2012, are intended to 
simplify default products, reduce administrative costs, improve 
governance of superannuation funds, and improve confidence in 
the self-managed superannuation sector. The two aspects of the 
reforms most relevant to fees are SuperStream and MySuper.  
SuperStream is a package of administrative reforms intended to 
reduce costs. It includes the introduction of consistent data 
standards in order to reduce manual handling; the use of tax file 
numbers as a unique identifier to help administrative processes, 
and mandatory consolidation of accounts within a fund. 
MySuper comprises a more uniform set of products intended for 
people who do not actively choose their fund. From January 2014 
every new default superannuation account has to be in a 
MySuper product, and all default funds must be transferred into a 
MySuper product by July 2017.  
Employers must make contributions to MySuper products for 
employees who have not chosen their own fund. Sales 
commissions cannot be paid on MySuper products. Some 
MySuper fees are limited to cost-recovery only; there must be a 
single investment product (which can be a lifecycle product), and 
standardised presentation of product information (including risk 
and fees) through a MySuper dashboard. 
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Stronger Super reform implementation timeline32 
From July, 2013:  MySuper products are being introduced. 
Funds must notify members with multiple 
accounts. 
From January, 2014:  Contributions for employees who do not 
nominate a super fund must be made to 
MySuper products. 
From July, 2014:  Use of electronic data standards becomes 
mandatory for employers with more than 20 
employees.  
From July, 2017:  Existing default investments must be 
transferred to a MySuper account. 
3.1 Savings will be modest 
Stronger Super is likely to produce cost savings. Its proponents 
originally anticipated savings of about $1 billion from back-office 
streamlining, plus a benefit from the removal of commissions from 
MySuper products (possibly worth up to $400 million). But even if 
these were fully realised and passed through to consumers, they 
would take system fees down by just less than 0.1 percentage 
points a year, leaving fees far above international best practice. 
There are also reasons to expect that SuperStream costs will not 
fall by as much as $1 billion, since the initial savings were 
calculated on a basket of reforms not all which have been 
implemented. As well, the initial modelling that generated the 
                                            
32 Swoboda (2014). 
savings estimate assumed that cost savings were passed onto 
fund members. However, for many funds, there is little 
relationship between costs incurred and fees charged.33 
These reforms involve account consolidation, the use of an 
individual’s  tax  file  number  as  a  unique  identifier,  and  the  
introduction of electronic data standards. Total savings were 
estimated at $1 billion a year.34 But industry analysts Rice Warner 
Actuaries expect that SuperStream will not save as much as 
anticipated because paper-based processes are not as 
widespread as assumed in the modelling.35 
Additional savings from the removal of commissions on MySuper 
products are unlikely to be large. Commissions on default 
products are no more than $400 million a year.36 More 
importantly, as MySuper products are not the only products most 
employers select, funds may be able to achieve similar sales 
ambitions with a different profile of commissions across the 
portfolio. 
Even if the cost-reducing reforms do lead to annual savings as 
large as the most optimistic estimates, and if the funds fully pass 
on the savings in reduced fees, this will only lower fees by about 
0.1 per cent of funds under management a year. The cost savings 
                                            
33 See Appendix 2. 
34 The Super System Review based its estimates of potential savings in part on 
SuperChoice (2009) and Ernst & Young (2009).  
35 Rice Warner (2012), p.32. 
36 High end of range estimated by industry analysts; also see Rainmaker 
Information (2010). 
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from Stronger Super do not put Australian superannuation costs 
anywhere near best practice.  
3.2 Stronger Super does not strongly increase fee-based 
competition 
The Stronger Super reforms will not put pressure on fees because 
they do not sufficiently shift the nature of competition in the 
superannuation market. Most employees and employers will stay 
disengaged. Most sophisticated buyers will continue to buy 
different products than other buyers. As a result there will be little 
additional pressure on funds to lower their fees for most account 
holders. There is therefore little reason to expect reduced costs to 
be passed on as reduced fees. Costly non-fee competition is likely 
to offset cost savings from Stronger Super, just as it has largely 
absorbed the savings from increasing scale over the last decade. 
The MySuper product may help those who want to compare 
superannuation products, but find it hard to do so. However, there 
are few in this category. Fewer than three per cent of people say 
that they do not compare the fees and charges of their 
superannuation account with other options because it is ‘too  
difficult’.37  
The MySuper product dashboard (a summary of product 
characteristics that all products must display) is unlikely to put 
pressure on fees. While it does improve the comparability with 
other MySuper products, it does little to improve the comparability 
of non-fee product features, such as the riskiness of the fund. The 
dashboard mandates the display of subjective information such as 
                                            
37 Colmar Brunton (2010b). 
‘target  returns’  rather  than  objective  information  based  on  the 
assets in which the fund is invested. It also omits information that 
is important to net returns, such as the turnover of the assets held 
by the fund. And in any event, much of the difficulty faced by 
people in comparing funds lies in a lack of financial sophistication 
and is not easily solved by improved product information.  
MySuper will make little difference for those who are not focused 
on retirement, are procrastinating or are not sufficiently focused 
on fees. MySuper does not provide any new mechanisms to 
encourage people to engage with their retirement savings.  
There may be some benefits from fee disclosure if the original 
plans for detailed fee disclosure are carried out. Under Stronger 
Super, funds may be obliged to make fee data accessible to the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. This would allow third-
party providers to provide better breakdowns of fees. Again, 
however, the changes are not large. Comparison sites have been 
around for a long time. For engaged account holders who are 
prepared to go to the trouble of looking at the product disclosure 
statement or a comparison site, it is already possible to determine 
the fee structure. 
The Stronger Super reforms have not changed the highly 
segmented market, in which people who are not fee sensitive get 
little benefit from any fee pressure. A large number of products 
are sold through multiple sales channels. Larger firms may still be 
able to negotiate lower fees. Fee sensitive individuals will still 
typically buy different products, through different channels, from 
those bought by disengaged individuals.  
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3.3 Early signs suggest the reforms will not make a step 
change 
Stronger Super is still early in its implementation, but there is 
evidence it has not increased fee pressure. Fees for MySuper 
products offered by industry, corporate and public sector funds 
are not lower than their precursors. There is also strong evidence 
that the basis of competition has not changed. MySuper fees are 
highly dispersed, suggesting that producers do not regard fees as 
the main basis of competition.  
In addition, the introduction of more comparable MySuper 
products has not reduced average fees. While it is not possible to 
create an average fee across all default and MySuper products, 
weighted by funds under management, it is possible to create a 
matched group of industry fund, corporate, and public sector 
products that have been authorised as MySuper products.38 For 
this group, the introduction of MySuper in July 2013 (Figure 13) 
has not cut fees. Indeed, there is evidence of fee increases. 
 
                                            
38 Some default products were previously selected by employers and not 
identified as defaults by funds in publicly available data, and many retail funds 
have introduced new MySuper products that have very little funds under 
management while large sums remain in previous products. All default funds 
must be transferred to MySuper products by July 2017. 
Figure 13: MySuper fees are not lower than fees of previous default 
products 
Fees for MySuper and direct precursor funds, per cent of funds under 
management, annual  
 
Note: Estimated FUM-weighted fees. All funds where data was available were included. 
The industry fund series (14 products; 2014 product FUM = $116b) and public sector 
series (3 MySuper products; 2014 product FUM = $43bn) are weighted by the FUM of 
products subsequently qualified as MySuper. The corporate series (12 MySuper products, 
2012 fund-level FUM = $38b) are weighted by fund FUM. For retail products, the estimated 
2014 MySuper fee is 1.19%, assuming MySuper FUM is proportional to fund FUM.. It is not 
possible to construct a time series for retail default products because the 2014 data lacks 
retail product level MySuper FUM, possibly because retail funds have not yet rolled default 
accounts into MySuper products. 
Source: Grattan analysis of SuperRatings (2014)  
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Some funds have also charged members for capital expenditures 
and levies related to the Stronger Super reforms.39 In markets 
where firms compete vigorously on fees, fee cuts, not increases, 
would normally accompany capital expenditure that is expected to 
reduce operating costs. While non-profit funds may have less 
latitude to absorb capital charges, several for-profit funds owned 
by entities with deep balance sheets are imposing transitional 
levies. The fact that funds have increased fees to cover capital 
expenditures suggests they are not very concerned about losing 
accounts based on fees or that they do not anticipate the 
expenditures to result in operating cost reductions. Neither 
explanation is encouraging. 
The introduction of MySuper does not appear to have significantly 
affected competition in features other than fees. The fact that the 
fees of MySuper products are spread over a broad range, as 
Figure 14 shows, suggests that non-fee factors continue to be 
important in the market for default funds. While the fee dispersion 
of MySuper products is less than that of other superannuation 
products, their fees nevertheless range from about 0.6 to about 
1.4 per cent a year, with a few much higher. A class of product 
that  was  intended  for  “members  who  simply  want  someone  else  to  
take  care  of  it  all  for  them”  is  now offered across a range of fees, 
and the fees many members will pay are high enough to reduce 
their retirement balances by well over 20 per cent.40 For those 
who are allocated the high-fee MySuper products, someone else 
is arguably not  “taking  care  of  it  all  for  them”.   
                                            
39 Business Spectator (2013). 
40 Cooper (2010). 
Figure 14: MySuper products are sold across a broad fee range  
Fee distribution: MySuper, 2014: number of products 
 
Notes: Not weighted by FUM as FUM is not available for 2014 given creation of new 
products. SuperRatings data captures 93 of 117 MySuper products. Bin width = 0.10%.  
Source: SuperRatings (2014).  
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4. Lessons from other pension systems 
Other countries have achieved much lower fees for retirement 
savers while retaining wide choice in superannuation products.  
There are four main lessons from overseas. First, running a 
government default fund, or centralising the collection of funds 
and the maintenance of accounts, can significantly reduce costs. 
Second, making firms compete on fees for the right to manage 
default funds also achieves low fees. Third, while measures to 
promote the comparability of funds are widely practised, they do 
not alone lead to low fees.  
Fourth, although many people know they should make an 
informed choice, they procrastinate in doing so. Outside 
retirement savings schemes, innovative mechanisms help people 
to overcome their reluctance to make a decision. These 
mechanisms should be introduced to help people choose 
superannuation funds. 
4.1 Centralising default fund administration reduces costs  
Many governments have achieved low fees by running a central 
default fund. They include the US Thrift Savings Plan (for 
employees  of  the  US  Federal  Government),  Sweden’s  AP7  Safa  
default  fund  and  the  UK’s  NEST  fund.  Central  management  of  
accounts coupled with competitively priced asset management 
reduces costs. The funds may auction some or all of their 
balances in large tranches that attract low cost bids from asset 
managers.41 The fees of funds that employ this model are 
radically lower than those that Australian superannuation 
investors pay. Investment management fees for the US TSP, the 
UK NEST,  and  Sweden’s  AP7  are  0.04,  0.38 and 0.22 per cent 
respectively.  
Other arrangements use private default funds but centralise 
payment flows or account administration. These can also 
generate significant savings. In New Zealand, Sweden and 
Mexico, employers send pension contributions to the tax office or 
another central clearinghouse, which forwards the funds to private 
pension providers. This method can reduce costs by using 
existing tax payment systems. It enables employers to make a 
single payment to the clearinghouse rather than payments to 
multiple funds. It also enables the government to ensure each 
account holder has only one account.  
In Sweden the government collects employer contributions when 
it collects payroll tax. The government administers individual 
accounts but individuals can choose any of the hundreds of 
pension funds on offer. The government aggregates individual 
monies and executes trades once a day in the wholesale funds 
market, securing discounts from the retail rate these funds usually 
offer. Centralisation has reduced the administration component of 
fees for Swedes to 0.14 per cent (with a cap at the equivalent of 
                                            
41 In markets where there are no discounting advantages for large buyers, they 
select low-cost exposures to assets (such as through running a largely passive 
index fund themselves, or buying shares in exchange traded funds).     
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AUD $19). Additional fees vary according to the private fund 
manager selected. 
4.2 Government tenders for default status drive down fees 
The most effective way to get superannuation fees down while 
retaining private provision is to make firms compete for the right to 
manage default funds. Variants of this model are used in Chile, 
New Zealand, and Mexico. In Chile, government tenders for the 
right to manage the default accounts of individuals as well as their 
money. Chile’s default fund is awarded in a biennial tender to the 
firm that offers to manage funds for the lowest fees. Tenderers 
must offer five defined asset allocation options, each set at the 
same fee. The winning fund receives all new default accounts 
opened in the following two years.  The account fee for the default 
fund is equivalent to about 0.2 per cent a year – less than one-
quarter of the Australian average default fee.  
The experience of New Zealand and Mexico offers a counterpoint. 
They select private default funds but do not place as much weight 
on  fees  as  Chile’s  system  does,  and  their fees are not as low. 
Mexico, which selects a group of funds based on their previous 
net performance, achieves an average fee of 1.15 per cent a 
year.42 New Zealand, which selects five default funds on a 
number of criteria, including fees, achieves average fees for 
default funds of 0.55 per cent a year. 43 
                                            
42 CONSAR (2014b) 
43 Government of New Zealand . “The tenders were evaluated according to 
technical criteria (70 per cent) such as organisational capability, member 
Figure 15 shows the annual fees charged under these fee-based 
and non-fee-based tenders, and compares them to Australia’s  
average default fee and those achieved by government-run 
defaults. Government-run default funds (which may use private 
asset managers) achieve fees of 0.03 to 0.4 per cent a year. Chile 
achieves a comparable result by tendering out default accounts to 
private providers and selecting exclusively based on fees. The 
Mexican and New Zealand models do not use fees as the 
dominant selection criterion and as a result do not achieve low 
fees.  
The Chilean, New Zealand and Mexican models treat asset 
allocation differently. In Chile, the winning fund must offer five 
products with different asset allocations but with identical fees. 
Mexican defaults use a life-cycle strategy, which involves shifting 
to less risky assets close to retirement, but they have been 
criticised for holding too high a proportion of assets in Mexican 
government bonds. In New Zealand, the default asset allocation 
has been criticised for over-emphasising low-risk assets and 
giving growth assets too little weight. 
                                                                                    
education and investment capability; and 30 per cent of the evaluation was on 
the  providers’  pricing  levels.”  
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Figure 15: Government defaults and fee-based tenders achieve low 
fees 
Fees on default defined-contribution products in a sample of comparable 
jurisdictions, per cent of funds under management, annual 
 
 
Note: 2014 or latest available. Conversion from percentage of contribution fees (for Chile 
and UK NEST) to funds under management fees done with following assumptions; 40-year 
contribution period, real wage growth of 1.8 per cent p.a., and real portfolio returns of 5 per 
cent as used in OECD (2012). NZ: Unweighted mean fees of nine default funds. Aus: 
weighted mean fees of MySuper products detailed in Figure 13.. 
Source: Thrift Savings Plan (2014); Superintendencia de Pensiones (2014); Swedish 
Pensions Agency (2013); (2014c); Government of New Zealand (2014a), UK Nest (2014); 
APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014); CONSAR (2013). 
The experience of Chile shows that competition for the right to be 
a default fund can be a powerful force that drives down default 
fees. It also shows that without additional policy steps, lower 
default fees will not drive fees down much for non-default funds. 
Fees  in  Chile’s  pension  system  were  high  for  many  years.  In 2008 
the Government responded with two key reforms. One was to only 
allow fees to be charged on contributions, in order to make fees 
easier to compare.44   The change initially led to an 11 per cent fall 
in fees as the funds repriced their products, but this momentum 
was short-lived.  
It was the other reform, the introduction of a tender for default 
funds as explained above, that really drove down fees. A provider 
that was new to Chile, Modelo, won the first tender in 2010. 
Modelo won with a fee 20 per cent below the weighted average 
fee in the market, and won again in 2012 with a fee 43 per cent 
below the average. In 2014, a small provider, Planvital, won the 
tender. Since the policy started, the fee paid by new default 
account holders has fallen by 65 per cent.  
                                            
44 Members must remain in the fund for 18 months. The winning fund must 
charge the winning fee to all its prior default customers. The pension authority in 
Chile estimated that roughly 200,000 new members would join each year. Taking 
into account that new members are likely to have an average taxable income 
that  is  considerably  lower  than  the  nation’s  average, winning the tender entitles 
the winner to roughly 7% of total contributions over the two year period 
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Figure 16: The tender system caused Chilean default fees to 
plummet  
Average and default fees in Chile, 1991-2015f; per cent of contributions   
 
Note: Fees are per cent of contributions. Not directly comparable with fees on preceding 
chart. Conversion to per cent of FUM assumes 40-year contribution period, real wage 
growth of 1.8 per cent, and real portfolio returns of 5 per cent as used in OECD (2012). 
Source: Grattan analysis of Superintendencia de Pensiones (2014). 
The winning default fund has also outperformed its more 
expensive competitors.  Modelo’s  funds performed as well as other 
funds even before fees were deducted. Because its fees were far 
less than the competition, its members enjoyed better returns than 
any other fund. Figure 17 shows the performance of a 
hypothetical  account  at  each  of  Chile’s  private  pension  funds,  
taking the introduction of the tender process as the starting date. 
Figure 17: The Chilean default has outperformed its peers so far 
$ balance of hypothetical account since default tenders began in 2010 
 
Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones (2014) 
Each month, the hypothetical account member made gross 
contributions of $100, from which their account fee was deducted. 
The monthly returns for each fund were then applied to the 
account balance for all asset-allocation categories available to 
Chilean savers (labelled Type A-E). In every single asset 
allocation category, the low-cost default outperformed all other 
funds. The low-cost default fund also had the least volatile 
returns. 
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Yet the Chilean reforms have not lowered costs for all account 
holders. Large fund providers have so far refrained from 
competing, perhaps because winning the tender would require 
them to lower prices for existing members. Many incumbent 
account-holders (both default and non-default) continue to pay 
high fees even as the fee for new default accounts has fallen, 
since very few switch to cheaper funds despite it being free and 
relatively simple for customers to do so and the availability of 
clear information about fees. Account-holders in funds that have 
not previously won a tender are on average paying fees well over 
double those who have benefited from the tender system. The 
lesson from Chile is that creating a low-cost default fund is the 
most important reform. But it is not enough.  
4.3 Disclosure and comparison alone are not enough 
The third finding from cross-country experience is that while many 
countries have sought to make funds easier to compare, there is 
little evidence that comparability by itself improves choices much, 
especially for default account holders. At best, it provides the 
foundation for good pension outcomes that more aggressive 
policy tools, such as tenders for default status, can achieve. 
Countries promote comparability between funds in three ways. 
First, they limit the types of charges that pension funds may 
impose on their members. Second, they mandate standard 
reporting of fees, asset allocation and returns in product 
disclosure statements and dashboards (tools that summarise the 
most important product information in a standardised way).  Third, 
they provide choice platforms on which people can compare funds 
and even switch from one fund to another. 
To make it easier for people to compare products, many countries 
restrict the types of fees that can be charged. New Zealand and 
Sweden limit fees to fixed account fees and investment 
management fees that are a constant percentage of funds under 
management. Similarly, Australia’s  MySuper  products may charge 
a fixed account fee and an investment charge as a percentage of 
funds under management, while other fees for switching 
investments or leaving a fund may be charged on a cost-recovery 
basis only. However, there are no limits on the types of fee that 
may be charged for other superannuation products in Australia. 
Many countries also insist that the information on product 
disclosure statements and/or dashboard tools must be uniform. 
The goal is to make fund characteristics as comparable as 
possible. However, many systems do not mandate measures that 
would assist informed choice: few compare fees and returns to 
the best available benchmarks, or mandate the reporting of the 
hidden  costs  of  buying  and  selling  assets  (“churn”).  Some, 
including Australia’s  new  MySuper  dashboard, include largely 
uninformative metrics such as target returns and subjective risk-
return measures.  
Some governments have built fund comparison tools or websites 
to aggregate comparison information. Some sites also permit 
people to switch funds. They may work reasonably well for those 
who seek them out and know how to interpret the information. The 
Swedish Pension Authority, for example, has built a fund 
comparison tool that shows key cost, return and risk measures for 
each fund. It allows account holders to drill down into each fund 
for more information.45 The tool is hosted on the same website on 
                                            
45 Swedish Pensions Agency (2014b). 
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which investment decisions are made and on which accounts can 
be checked. It also enables account holders to switch to a new 
provider.  
New Zealand, similarly, has provided an accessible website for 
comparison.46 It provides data on all Kiwisaver products, including 
default funds. It groups funds into risk categories, and fees are 
easy to compare using data that funds are required to provide. 
Yet the New Zealand site does not enable account holders to 
select, and switch to, a new provider.  
These innovations to increase comparability are worthwhile. But 
there is extensive evidence that they do little to improve the 
choices investors make. Most people people remain disengaged 
even when comparability is high.47 As the OECD put it, 
“The  main  limitation  of  such  initiatives,  especially  in  countries  
that target lower income employees, is the general apathy 
among individuals towards retirement savings and a much 
greater  response  among  individuals  to  providers’  marketing  
strategies  than  to  fee  levels.”48 
Chile’s  reform  experience,  for  example,  shows  that  increasing  
comparability does not help much for choice products: fees were 
little affected by improved comparability. Similarly, the introduction 
of tendering for default status drove default fees down but has not 
generated much pressure to lower non-default fees.  
                                            
46 Government of New Zealand (2014b). 
47 One fund manager increased the comparability of its PDSs but those reporting 
the  PDS  was  ‘too  hard  to  understand’  barely  changed.  AXA (2009). 
48 OECD (2012). 
4.4 Trigger events help overcome procrastination, but are 
rarely used 
Mandated defined contribution pensions are designed in part to 
overcome discounting, procrastination and inertia. But tools that 
protect choice while overcoming the widespread tendency of 
people to put off comparing funds have not been widely used.49  
Outside of mandated savings systems, some efforts to overcome 
procrastination have shown signs of success. For example there 
is an approach to increasing saving known as ‘Save  More  
Tomorrow’, in which people commit to increase the share of their 
pay packets allocated to pension funds in future. It has been 
implemented at some companies with some success. In this way, 
they are encouraged to overcome their tendency to delay 
decisions affecting their future wellbeing. Similarly, GPs may 
recommend tests to patients when they reach certain ages. In 
some states of the United States, people renewing a driving 
licence or registering a vehicle may be asked whether they wish 
to join an organ donation register, or register to vote. 
Yet few systems have created regular opportunities for people to 
be confronted with information about their superannuation 
products, and to act on that information.  For example, it appears 
that other systems have not linked pension comparison to other 
regular administrative obligations such as tax filing. In Australia, 
workers often have the opportunity to change superannuation 
when they change jobs, but new employees see only the options 
provided by their employer. Little objective information is 
presented to help them compare.  
                                            
49 O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). 
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5. How to get superannuation fees down 
Australia urgently needs to get superannuation fees down. We are 
used to accepting fees of 1 or even 2 per cent of balances a year 
as reasonable figures. We need to learn from international 
experience and target fees at 0.5 per cent of funds under 
management, at most. How can this be done? 
Two simple reforms will work together to sharply intensify 
pressure on fees and push the industry to become much leaner. 
They build on existing regulations and create options to further 
improve the system.  
The first reform will cut fees for account holders who are 
disengaged. The government should introduce wholesale price 
pressure on default superannuation products. It should hold a fee-
based tender to select one or more non-government funds to be 
the default fund. 
The second reform will make it much easier for Australians to 
select a better superannuation product. Government should make 
tax time super choice time. The Australian Tax Office should add 
a stage in the annual tax return process at which taxpayers can 
compare their current superannuation fees with the fees charged 
by the winner of the wholesale tender, and switch on the spot if 
they so desire.  
5.1 Select default funds in a fee-based tender 
The Commonwealth Government needs to unleash the power of 
wholesale competition to push down fees for default products. 
The best way to do so is to run a tender. One or more funds that 
tender the lowest fees would win the right to be offered as a 
default for a period. All other funds would be excluded from 
consideration until the next auction, and would have to compete in 
the market as choice products. APRA would continue to assess 
candidate funds to ensure they meet prudential standards.  
Figure 18 sets out the issues that would need to be addressed in 
defining the tender. Government would first need to define the 
default product or products. Using the MySuper product 
definitions as a base, it should narrow the range of products that 
can be put forward as candidates for default status. It should 
specify an asset allocation range or ranges, to prevent a race to 
the bottom in which providers offer funds that offer exposure only 
to assets, such as term deposits, that cost least to manage but 
are inappropriate as a prime vehicle for lifetime savings. It could, 
for example, specify a single asset allocation -- perhaps a life-
cycle product that adjusts asset allocation as people approach 
retirement.  
Alternatively, the government could hold several tenders for a 
range of asset allocations, and let other parties, such as 
employers and Fair Work Australia (should it retain a role) select 
from the list of funds that bid lowest in each class. It will also need 
to set limits on trading volumes, or include the cost of churn in the 
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fees and have funds commit to not exceed the cost of churn they 
include in their bid. Finally, it will need to hold a separate 
competitive tender for any insurance that is to be offered through 
the fund. 
Government should also define the period during which the 
winners of the tender would manage accounts, and the funds they 
would manage. The Chilean experience shows that a period of 
about two years creates sufficiently intense competitive pressure. 
Allocating tender winners the right to manage all new default 
accounts opened during the period is the most practical option, 
because  it  does  not  disrupt  the  management  of  the  ‘back  book’  of  
default funds. Over time, successive winners would capture a 
large fraction of default funds as people switched jobs.  
Third, the tender process should be designed to elicit competitive 
bids. As the details of tenders and auctions are critical to results, 
further careful work will be needed to design the process.  
Fourth, the roles of APRA, employers, and Fair Work Australia 
would need to be defined. APRA would likely retain its current role 
of pre-qualifying candidates for default status. If the tender 
produces multiple candidates (for example, one in each of a 
number of asset allocation classes), employers or FWA could 
continue to play a role in selecting from a shortlist of winning 
default options.  
 
 
Figure 18: Elements of the proposal to hold a tender for default 
funds. 
 
Source: Grattan analysis. 
Finally, supporting reforms will be needed. Changes to protect 
account holders on what will become legacy MySuper products 
may be required. These may include limits to fee increases at 
least for some period of time. Over time, funds managed by 
previous winners of the default tender would be subject to similar 
rules. The winner of the default would be prohibited from 
attempting to induce default customers to buy other products for a 
period of time. 
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While the winning fees in the tender cannot be predicted 
precisely, fees of around 0.4 per cent a year appear to be an 
upper limit, based on the experience in the smaller Chilean 
market and on the most competitively priced funds, with 
appropriate asset allocations, that are active in the Australian 
market today.  
Figure 19: Annual savings from a tender for default funds could 
reach  $3b  at  today’s  system  scale. 
Fee curve by industry segment, per cent of funds under management 
 
Note: Estimated default FUM only. FUM is mid-2013. Assumes default products are 70 per 
cent of public sector, industry, and corporate funds under management, and 20 per cent of 
retail funds under management.  
Source: Grattan analysis; industry analyst judgement (default shares); APRA (2014a); 
SuperRatings (2014). 
If  the  default  volumes  remain  at  today’s  figure  of  a  third  of  total  
system funds, the savings will rise over time to well over $2.8 
billion  dollars  a  year  at  today’s  system size. As the system grows, 
so will the potential for savings. 
5.2 Make tax time super choice time 
The second major reform to intensify pressure on fees is designed 
to make it much easier for account holders to compare their 
current fund to the winner of the default tender. The ATO should 
host a superannuation choice platform that taxpayers visit when 
they submit their tax returns.  
The proposal would add a step to the tax return process. 
Taxpayers would get an opportunity to review their 
superannuation product, compare it to the tender-winning default 
fund or funds, and, if desired, switch providers. Figure 20 sets out 
the main elements of the proposal. 
The choice platform should become a routine part of the tax return 
process. It should provide both the information found on the 
product dashboard of  the  account  holder’s  current  fund  and  that  of  
the winning default funds. It should contain information to educate 
users of the importance of the different aspects of products (fees, 
risk, asset allocation, historical returns, and so on). It should also 
enable account holders to switch funds on the spot. 
The choice platform would help to reach customer groups that 
currently are not actively assessing their superannuation options, 
including those on defaults and others. It may help to engage 
customers who remain on high-fee products. 
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Figure 20: Elements  of  the  proposal  to  ‘make  tax time super choice 
time’. 
 
Source: Grattan analysis. 
While the savings from a choice platform of this type are difficult 
to estimate, Figure 21 indicates the size of the opportunity by 
setting out the current estimated funds under management for 
non-default funds. Up to $10 billion is paid today in 
superannuation fees (including expenses of self- managed funds) 
over and above the rate that could be achieved by a competitively 
tendered default product. The competitive pressure exerted by the 
default may induce funds to cut fees and expenses in their choice 
product lines. 
Figure 21: Making tax time super choice time could highlight large 
fee disparities. 
Non-default funds: funds under management and estimated fees 
 
Note:  Estimated choice FUM only. FUM is mid-2013. Assumes 30 per cent of public 
sector, industry, and corporate funds under management, and 80 per cent of retail funds 
under management (and 100 per cent of self-managed) are non-default products.  
Source: Grattan analysis; industry analyst expert judgment of default shares; APRA 
(2014a); SuperRatings (2014). 
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6. Conclusion
The  Superannuation  Guarantee,  Australia’s  universal  and 
compulsory system of superannuation, was introduced in 1992 to 
ensure that workers made adequate provision for their retirement. 
As the population ages, compulsory super also seeks to take the 
pressure off Age Pension payments and the Commonwealth 
Budget. Excessively high fees substantially erode both these 
policy goals. 
A redesign of the superannuation system in order to reduce fees 
is long overdue. There is no reason why Australians should pay 
fees of 1.2 per cent of their superannuation balances, on average, 
when superannuation account holders across the OECD pay on 
average a third of that amount. The unfairness is particularly 
acute when the Australian funds that charge the highest fees 
actually produce the lowest returns – in some cases, zero return.  
This report proposes reforms that have the potential to save $10 
billion a year in excessive fees. The reforms will sharpen 
competitive pressure on superannuation fees by making funds 
tender for the right to run a low-cost default fund that all new job 
starters will pay into unless they make other arrangements. A 
second key reform will make the system transparent by enabling 
account holders to easily compare the cost of their fund to the 
new default fund at tax time – and to switch on the spot if they so 
choose. 
The reforms will help to address a fundamental threat to the 
adequacy of retirement incomes in Australia. They will also 
reduce pressure on the Age Pension and the taxpayer’s  dollar. 
The simpler, lower-cost superannuation system that will result will 
also increase the size of the economic pie by freeing up workers, 
managers, and capital goods to produce more value elsewhere. 
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Appendix 1: How superannuation fees relate to expenses
This appendix provides additional details on the relationship 
between fees and expenses in Australian superannuation funds. It 
also provides details on how the estimates of list fees used in this 
report were created. 
Box 1 summarises the relationship between fees (charged to 
account holders) and expenses (reported to the regulator).  
Figure 22 shows that list fee estimates calculated in the course of 
preparing this report, based on data provided by the 
superannuation research firm SuperRatings, are similar to those 
calculated by two other research firms, Rice Warner and 
Rainmaker. All of them have trended down slightly since 2002, 
from just under 1.4 per cent of funds under management, to 
around 1.2 per cent. 
Australian superannuation expenses have remained around 0.8 
per cent of funds under management since 2004, even as the 
scale of the superannuation system has grown. APRA reports 
costs by category, shown in Figure 23. It can be seen that overall 
reported costs have not declined, while cost components have 
varied somewhat.  
 
 
 
Box: Fees and fund expenses 
Account fees are charged by superannuation funds to their 
members. They may include a dollar-per-year  ‘membership  fee’,  
and other fees, such as investment management fees, which are 
expressed as a proportion of total funds in the account. These 
fees exclude insurance premiums. Some accounts pay lower than 
list fees because some funds provide discounts to members 
based on account balance, or employment with a particular 
employer.  
Fund expenses are incurred by superannuation funds to 
administer and manage retirement savings. They include 
investment expenses, payments to trustees and directors, 
professional services from auditors and actuaries, administration 
expenses, and other management expenses. They may include 
expenses incurred by the superannuation fund in administering 
insurance (likely to be at most 0.1 per cent per year). This report 
uses fund-level expense data collected by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA).  
The difference between fund expenses reported to APRA and 
fees received is profit (on in the case of non-profit funds, surplus), 
and a range of expenses not reported.50  
                                            
50 APRA notes that reported fund expenses may be below the total expenses 
incurred by superannuation funds. The three categories they highlight are 
indirect investment expenses (such as the costs of buying and selling assets 
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Figure 22: Fee estimates are similar and exceed expenses 
Fees and expenses In Australian superannuation, 2003-2014  
Per cent of funds under management 
 
Note: Grattan analysis of product fee data. Weighted by FUM. Expense ratios are for 
APRA regulated funds only. Fee estimates include self-managed superannuation funds at 
1.0 per cent (Rice Warner), 0.85 per cent (Rainmaker) and 0.925 (Grattan).  
Source: Rice Warner (2012); APRA (2014a); Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a) and 
SuperRatings (2014); Rainmaker Information (2013). 
                                                                                    
where there is a buy-sell spread); entry and exit fees; and front-end and ongoing 
commissions. See APRA (2014b). 
Figure 23: Fund expense ratio has changed little; some 
components have varied 
Superannuation fund expenses, 2004-13 
Per cent of funds under management,  
 
Note: Expenses exclude commissions, and trading costs such as buy-sell spreads. Costs 
are weighted by funds under management. APRA regulated funds only - excludes SMSF 
and some public sector funds.  
Source: APRA (2014b). 
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Fund expenses and account fees are quite closely related for 
many not for profit funds. Many funds in the retail sector have 
account fees significantly higher than their reported fund 
expenses (Figure 24).  
This report uses fee estimates at the fund created from product-
level fee data collected by SuperRatings on the balanced 
investment options of each funds. Those products are usually the 
largest, by FUM, managed by each fund. The data included 134 
products in 2006, 177 in 2007, 219 in 2008, 264 in 2009, 293 in 
2010, 304 in 2011, 313 in 2012 and 317 products in 2013.  
90 per cent of the products in the SuperRatings data were 
matched to a fund in the APRA data for 2013, and 44 per cent of 
APRA funds had a product in the SuperRatings dataset. In 2006, 
this sample reflects about 35 per cent of funds under 
management in APRA funds, and by 2013 accounts for 75 per 
cent of funds under management. Where a fund had multiple 
products in the data, the fees of these products were weighted by 
their funds under management, and applied to the matched fund. 
There is no statistically significant difference in the cost 
characteristics between the funds that were matched and those 
that were not. Neither is there a statistically significantly difference 
between the fees of products that were matched and those that 
were not. The fees from these products were calculated for an 
account size of $50,000.51 
                                            
51  This approach may induce an upward bias of up to 0.05 per cent in average 
fee estimates for later years, as actual balances per account holder has doubled 
in the last decade. Offsetting this, the estimates do not allow for the growing 
number of accounts per account holder.   
Figure 24: Retail fund list fees are well above reported expenses 
List fees and reported expenses, 2013 
Per cent of funds under management
 
Source: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014). 
There is wide dispersion in both costs and fees across 
superannuation funds. Figure 25 and Figure 26 chart expenses 
and fees on the vertical axis and cumulative funds under 
management on the horizontal axis.  
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Figure 25:  Not-for-profit  funds’  fees  and  expenses  are  similar 
Superannuation expenses and list fees, not-for-profit funds, 2013 
Per cent of funds under management 
 
Note: Expense ratios are from APRA fund-level dataset. Includes public sector, not-for-
profit corporate plans and industry funds. Fees are for default investment options within 
each fund, sourced from SuperRatings. Fees are not available for all APRA funds. Dark 
red areas denote funds for which estimated list fees are below expenses reported to 
APRA. 
Source: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 26: For-profit  funds’  expenses  vary  widely and fees are high   
Superannuation expenses and list fees, for-profit funds. 2013 
Per cent of funds under management 
Note: Expense ratios are from the APRA fund-level dataset. Includes retail funds (including 
employer plans offered by for-profit funds). Fees are for default investment options within 
each fund, sourced from SuperRatings. Fees are not available for all APRA funds. Dark 
red areas denote funds for which estimated list fees are below expenses reported to 
APRA.  
Source: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014). 
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Appendix 2: Fees and returns in superannuation 
This appendix presents a more detailed assessment of the 
relationship between expenses, fees and returns in Australian 
superannuation summarised in Chapter 1 of the main report.  
Why fees typically reduce returns 
Chapter 1 showed that Australian superannuation funds that 
charged high average fees generated lower average net returns 
over the period 2004-2013.  
The weight of evidence from longer time periods and other 
markets is in line with these findings. A recent study by 
Morningstar, a large research firm, ranked US mutual funds 
according to various metrics (including fees, past performance, 
and  Morningstar’s  own  ratings)  in  2005-2008, and followed the 
performance of those funds over time. Their main conclusion:  
“If  there's  anything  in  the  whole  world  of  mutual  funds  that  you  
can take to the bank, it's that expense ratios help you make a 
better decision. In every single time period and data point 
tested, low-cost funds beat high-cost  funds.”52 
Nobel laureate William Sharpe showed that it is logically 
impossible for actively managed funds -- funds that tend to charge 
higher fees -- to collectively outperform lower-fee passive funds 
that are invested in the same market. A low-fee passive fund--one 
that holds all securities according to their weight in the market -- 
                                            
52 Kinnel (2010). 
will have performance before fees equal to the market as a whole. 
As the average passive fund will earn market returns before fees, 
so too must the average active fund, because only active funds 
own the part of the market not covered by passive funds.53 
Consequently, actively managed funds, whose costs are higher, 
must underperform the market in aggregate after fees. 
Summarising the implications, Sharpe writes: 
 “Properly  measured, the average actively managed dollar 
must underperform the average passively managed dollar, net 
of costs. Empirical analyses that appear to refute this principle 
are  guilty  of  improper  measurement.”54 
It is impossible for the average high-fee fund to outperform the 
market, but individual high-fee funds can do so, at least for a 
while. Some superannuation funds have consistently 
outperformed their peers.55 But as shown in Chapter 1, persistent 
outperformance among Australian superannuation funds from 
2004 to 2012 was largely due to low fees. Over that period, fees 
proved a more reliable predictor of future net returns than did 
previous net returns.  
                                            
53 To  test  whether  the  ‘bad  end’  of  the  active  management  distribution  (the  funds  
that underperform) are held by foreigners, we checked the returns on foreign-
held equity investments in Australia available in ABS (2014a). A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on foreign returns and the ASX 200 does not reject the hypothesis 
that foreigners earn equivalent returns as domestic investors. 
54 Sharpe (1991)  
55 Deloitte Access Economics Pty Ltd (2012). 
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This finding has been replicated many times across financial 
markets. Most professional fund managers cannot outperform 
market indexes for long after fees, and high-fee funds are more 
likely than others to perform less well in future.56 Nobel laureate 
Eugene Fama describes the phenomenon:  
“After  costs,  only  the  top  3%  of  managers  produce  a  return  that  
indicates they have sufficient skill to just cover their costs, 
which means that going forward, and despite extraordinary 
past returns, even the top performers are expected to be only 
as good as a low-cost passive index fund. The other 97% can 
be expected to do worse.”  57 
Fama explains why few managers who are paid to pick stocks, 
bonds, and other assets can systematically add value for their 
investors  after  fees.  Fama’s  insight  is  that  virtually  all  publicly  
available information about the value of an asset is already 
incorporated into its price.58 Fama's insight has been described as 
“the  closest  thing  finance  has  to  Newton's  laws”.59 While a given 
manager may have a good run, this may be more luck than skill.  
The only caveat is that high fee funds may offer investment in 
asset classes that low-fee funds cannot. If there are not well-
developed and liquid markets in an asset class (such as in private 
equity, venture capital, property, infrastructure or in less 
developed economies), it may be possible for active management 
                                            
56 Fama and French (2010); Barras, et al. Ibid. 
57 Fisher (2012). 
58 Malkiel and Fama (1970). 
59Smith (2013). 
to exceed the returns from a passive portfolio with exposure to 
other asset classes for a while. But these opportunities tend to be 
riskier than others and excess returns are usually eroded over 
time.  
Fees and returns in superannuation performance. 
This section provides additional detail behind the findings reported 
in Chapter 1 on the relationship between fees and returns from 
2004-2013. In summary: there is modest persistence in the 
outperformance of individual funds. Almost all of the 
outperformance is due to persistent differences in fees. On 
average, high-fee funds earn lower net returns than others, 
without reducing risk. Many funds achieve lower returns or higher 
risk than could have been achieved by a low-cost diversified 
holding of the same asset classes. 
Savers should prefer saving into funds that are likely to earn 
higher returns. To this end, many product dashboards allow 
potential members to compare funds based on their historical 
return. This is for a good reason: funds with good historical 
returns tend to have good returns in the future. In the language of 
economists, net returns have serial correlation.  
Figure 27 shows that funds that had high net returns in one year, 
on average, had high net returns in the following year. The slope 
of  the  regression  line  is  about  ⅓,  so  the  persistence  is  not  strong:  
a fund with returns one per cent about the average of all funds in 
one  year  could  be  expected,  on  average,  to  deliver  just  ⅓  of  one  
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per cent outperformance in the following year.60 In addition, while 
the relationship is statistically significant, there is a lot of noise: 
many funds that outperform in one year do not outperform the 
following year.  
Figure 27: Outperformance of net returns shows some persistence 
over time 
Net returns, deviation from average across funds, annual 2006-2013 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of  APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014). 
                                            
60 Figure 27 is  a  textbook  case  of  ‘regression  to  mediocrity’,  the  origin  of  the  
expression  ‘regression  line’.  An  early  finding  was  that  sons  were  usually  closer  to  
average height than their fathers. Galton (1886). 
Previous studies into the serial correlation of superannuation 
returns in Australia exclude the impacts of fees, perhaps because 
constructing a panel dataset that contains both net returns and 
average fees for funds is a difficult and expensive process.61 Such 
a dataset was constructed for this report.  
Fees and returns are strongly correlated: high-fee funds 
underperform others. Figure 28 charts the average fees of each 
fund over the period 2006-2013 against its average net returns 
over the same period.  
It can be seen that the relationship between fees and returns is a 
strong one. The slope of the line is about -1.4: a fund with fees 
one percentage point below average could be expected to 
generate returns about 1.4 per cent above average.  
That is because high-fee and low-fee funds differ by more than 
just their fees. High-fee funds tend to have lower gross returns, 
either because they incur additional unreported costs (such as the 
costs of frequently buying and selling assets for which buy prices 
are above sell prices at each point in time), or because they hold 
asset classes that experienced lower returns over the period. 
Together, lower gross returns and higher fees reduce net returns.  
                                            
61 Source: Deloitte Access Economics Pty Ltd (2012); Basu and Andrews (2014). 
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Figure 28: Fees strongly reduce  superannuation  funds’  returns 
Net returns, annualised average outperformance and fund-level fees, 
2006-2013 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of  APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Outperformance of gross returns shows little 
persistence over time  
Annual gross returns, deviation from weighted average across funds, 
2006-2013 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of  APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014) 
 
Do funds that outperform consistently do so mostly because their 
gross returns are consistently high, or mostly because their fees 
are consistently low? The answer is the latter. Gross returns have 
little persistence over time (Figure 29). It can be seen that the 
slope of the line is little different from zero. A fund that beats the 
market (before fees) in one year is barely more likely than chance 
to do it again the next year.   
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The persistence in net returns is explained instead by persistence 
in fees. Figure 30 shows that fees are highly persistent. 
Expensive funds tend to stay expensive, while cheap funds stay 
cheap.  
The  analysis  above  shows  that  most  of  a  fund’s  performance  
deviation from average returns over time is due to the deviation in 
its fees from the average. More sophisticated econometric 
methods show the same. A panel autoregressive model suggests 
that an increase in lagged after-fee returns of 1 percentage point 
is associated with higher after-fee returns today, of about 0.25 per 
cent (statistically significantly different from zero). However, when 
the same model is run on gross (before-fee) returns, the impact of 
an  increase  in  gross  returns  last  year  of  1  per  cent  on  this  year’s  
gross returns falls to 0.07 per cent (p = 0.08; not significantly 
different from zero at 95 per cent confidence level).  
The gross returns of retail funds, corporate funds and public 
sector funds do not have any significant serial correlation.62 
Industry funds do appear to have slightly persistent gross returns: 
an increase in an  industry  fund’s  gross  returns  of  1  per  cent  last  
year is associated with an increase in gross returns of 0.13 per 
cent this year (p=0.01). This is consistent with previous research 
and may be explained by differences in asset allocation and 
trading practices.63 
                                            
62 A Wald test on the panel AR(1) coefficient has p of 0.53 for corporate, retail 
and public-sector funds, implying that any serial correlation in returns is not 
significantly different from zero. 
63 Cummings and Ellis (2011). 
Figure 30: Fees are highly persistent over time 
Fees in successive years, per cent of funds under management, 2006-
2013 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of  APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014) 
The above analysis shows that while historical net returns are 
helpful in selecting funds, they are not nearly as helpful as 
knowing the fees alone. Historical returns are a noisy signal of a 
fund’s  potential  to  achieve good future returns; fees are a much 
clearer signal. A superannuation account holder or a selector of 
default funds should use fees as the main guide to fund selection, 
in selecting between diversified funds with similar asset classes.  
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How well does the strategy of selecting funds based on their fees 
perform? Figure 31 charts the subsequent returns of two groups 
of funds, selected afresh in each year. The first group is the 
cheapest 10 per cent of funds in that year. The second group is 
funds with the highest annual average historical return in prior 
years. Both of these rules were followed for each year from 2006 
to 2011.64  
Figure 31 illustrates how these two groups performed against the 
average of all funds in each year. Both groups tend to outperform 
the average of all funds. There is significant variation from year to 
year. For example, in 2008 and 2009, when there were large 
shifts in share market values, the historical returns of funds in 
each year were very poor predictors of future returns. In three of 
the six years, the best previous performers subsequently 
outperformed funds with the lowest fees, by under 0.2 percentage 
points per year. In the other three years, the lowest-fee group 
outperformed the best previous performers by at least 0.3 per 
cent, and up to 1 per cent per year.  
Figure 9 in Chapter 1 summarises the average outcomes of these 
rules from 2006 to 2011. It shows that on average, low-fee funds 
went on to perform better than funds that previously had high net 
performance.  
                                            
64 If a fund that was selected in a given year closed down, the hypothetical 
investment in that fund was carried across to the other funds that initially 
satisfied the same rule on an equal-weighted basis. 
Figure 31: Low fees better predict later returns than do previous 
high returns  
Subsequent outperformance of fund groups, 2006-2013.  
Performance since decision year relative to all funds, per cent annual 
 
Note:  In each year in the sample from 2006 to 2011, three sets of funds are compiled. 
The first is all funds; the second are the 10 per cent  whose prior returns (for history back 
to 2004); the third are the 10 per cent with the lowest fees. The chart shows the 
subsequent outperformance in remaining years to June 2013 of the low-fees and high-
performance group of each year. 
Source:  Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014). 
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Fees, returns, asset allocation and volatility.  
This section shows that Australian funds that charged higher fees 
over the period 2004-2013 delivered lower average returns and 
did not compensate with lower volatility. 
Figure 32 shows the implied after-fee, after-tax and after-inflation 
performance achieved by the full range of asset classes in which 
Australian superannuation funds are invested.65 It shows that 
some asset classes delivered high real returns and high risk 
(shares and property); others delivered low real returns and low 
risk (bonds and cash). Combinations of the best asset classes 
define an (ex-post) risk-return frontier, which is the upper left hand 
side of the grey box. Other asset classes (international bonds; 
unlisted property) delivered lower returns or higher volatility than a 
combination of the best asset classes would have delivered. The 
implied average real return of each asset class in Figure 32 
should be expected to be lower than index returns as it is net of 
fees and churn costs.  
                                            
65 The implied returns for each asset class are obtained by regressing fund-level 
net returns on the average asset allocation weights for each asset class, using 
OLS, for each year. The risk metric is the standard deviation of implied asset-
level returns.  
Figure 32: Asset returns and risk define an efficient frontier 
Implied risk/return characteristics of assets held by Australian 
superannuation funds, 2004-2013. Per cent, annual, real 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a).  
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Figure 33: High fee funds have lower returns than low fee funds 
and almost identical volatility  
Risk-return performance of funds, 2004-2013 
Per cent, annual, real  
 
Source: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014a); SuperRatings (2014). Q1 is the lowest-fee 
quintile of funds; Q5 the highest-fee.  
Figure 33 above shows the performance of superannuation funds 
relative to the performance of the assets they hold. It shows that 
high fees are the major driver of low net returns at the fund level 
over the period: few funds outside those in the lowest-fee 40 per 
cent of funds achieved returns close to the efficient frontier. 
 
Concluding remarks  
This appendix has shown that fees account for the bulk of the 
variation in returns of individual superannuation funds. Average 
future returns are higher for funds with low past fees than they are 
for funds with high past net returns. Funds with low average 
returns have not compensated with lower risk. 
These findings imply that account holders, or those responsible 
for selecting defaults, should select low-fee, low-tax, low-churn 
funds with diversified exposure to the asset allocation (or in the 
risk-return class) appropriate to the risk appetite of the account 
holder.  
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Appendix 3: Country system vignettes
There are many defined-contribution (DC) systems. Many of them 
are  small  or  have  higher  expenses  than  Australia’s.  Figure 34 
shows the size and average fees charged across the range of DC 
systems. It also includes a set of defined-benefit systems.66 
Australia is one of the largest systems but has costs higher than 
18 of the 24. It is the largest defined-contribution system, but has 
costs that are only exceeded by systems 10 or 100 times smaller.  
This appendix provides vignettes on four DC pension systems 
that have adopted innovative approaches to reducing fees or have 
institutional similarities to Australia.  
The two systems with government-run defaults have achieved low 
fees. Sweden uses a government-run default and has centralised 
of account administration while retaining a wide range of 
investment choice. The US Thrift Savings Plan, the defined-
contribution plan for US Federal Government employees, was 
analysed due to the exceptionally low fees it charges. 
The two systems that retain full private provision have adopted 
innovative tendering arrangements. New Zealand has institutional 
similarities to Australia. Chile introduced the first mandatory DC 
system and has been an innovator in creating price pressure on 
default products. Other Latin American countries have tended to 
model themselves on Chile.  
                                            
66 See Impavido, et al. (2010) and the vignettes compiled in Productivity 
Commission (2012), Appendix 2 for discussions of many of these DC systems.  
Figure 34:  Australia’s  superannuation  system  expenses  exceed  
others of similar scale  
Funded pension expense, per cent of funds under management, annual 
 
Note: Year:  2012  or  latest  prior  to  2012.  For  the  purpose  of  this  chart  ‘defined  benefit’  is  a  
system where greater than 60% of assets are in defined benefit plans; others are allocated 
to defined contribution. The chart includes 22 countries, the US Thrift Savings Plan (the 
defined contribution fund for US public servants) and the Swedish private pension system. 
See Appendix 3 for a version of this chart with countries identified.   
Source: Thrift Savings Plan (2014), Swedish Pensions Agency (2013), Swedish Pensions 
Agency (2014a); OECD.Stat (2014a); OECD.Stat (2014b); OECD (2013) 
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The US Thrift Savings Plan 
Employees of the US federal government, including uniformed 
forces, are eligible to enrol in the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). The 
TSP is an optional, defined-contribution government-run 
retirement savings plan that offers a limited range of options and 
charges exceptionally low account fees.  
The TSP aggregates account balances before tendering out large 
tranches of funds to private-sector fund managers. The result is 
an annual fee of 0.029%. In part, the low fees reflect scale 
economies that are difficult to replicate in more decentralised 
systems given all account holders share the same, very large 
employer. It has been asserted that the fees charges do not 
reflect the true cost of the scheme are as some costs are borne 
by employing government agencies and not by the TSP itself.67  
Account holders who do select an investment option are allocated 
to a product that is wholly invested in government securities. 
Those  who  wish  to  select  a  fund  have  six  options,  including  a  ‘life-
cycle’  option  that  shifts  asset  exposures  towards lower-risk assets 
towards retirement. The options are set out in Table 1.  
 
 
 
                                            
67 Investment Company Institute (2007). 
Table 1: US TSP: Product options/asset allocation matrix 
 
Fund Investment Style Objective Risk Fee 
G Government securities 
Interest income 
without risk of loss of 
principal 
Inflation risk 0.027% 
F 
Government, 
corporate, and 
mortgage-
backed bonds 
To match the 
performance of the 
Barclays Capital 
U.S. Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Market risk, 
Credit risk, 
Prepayment 
risk, 
Inflation risk 
0.039% 
C 
Stocks of large 
and medium-
sized U.S. 
companies 
To match the 
performance of the 
Standard & Poor's 
500 (S&P 500) Index 
Market risk, 
Inflation risk 0.029% 
S 
Stocks of small 
to medium-sized 
U.S. companies  
To match the 
performance of the 
Dow Jones U.S. 
Completion TSM 
Index 
Market risk, 
Inflation risk 0.026% 
I 
International 
stocks of 21 
developed 
countries 
To match the 
performance of the 
Morgan Stanley 
Capital International 
EAFE Index 
Market risk, 
Currency 
risk, 
Inflation risk 
0.029% 
 
Source: Federal Retirement Thrift Board (2014)  
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The Swedish premium pension system
Swedes make mandatory contributions of 2.5% of wages to a 
‘premium  pension’  in  addition  to  their  larger  notional  defined  
contribution system.68  
The premium pension system offers a government run default and 
a broad range of private sector choice, supported by centralised 
account  administration.  Account  holders’  balances  are  aggregated  
by  a  government  clearing  house  and  allocated  ‘wholesale’  to  
private fund managers.  
These amounts are paid by employers along with payroll tax and 
collected through a government-run clearing-house. The Swedish 
Pensions Agency (SPA) is the sole provider of individual account 
administration and is also the manager of public pensions. The 
centralisation of administration leads to large economies of scale -
- the administrative fee for private pension accounts in 2012 was 
0.14% per year, with a cap at the equivalent of AUD $19, which 
reduced the average administration cost to just 0.10%.69 
If Swedes abstain from choosing, their account balances are 
placed in a government-run life-cycle fund. This fund allocates 
individuals wholly into equities until they turn 56 whereby it starts 
transitioning  them  into  fixed  income.  The  fund’s  annual  investment  
fees vary according to the exposure to equities, from 0.05-0.12% 
of funds under management.70 As a result, total costs of the 
                                            
68 OECD (2012). 
69 Swedish Pensions Agency (2013). 
70 Swedish Pensions Agency (2014c). 
government run default are at most 0.26 per cent of funds under 
management. Most people are paying less.   
Swedes may elect to invest their premium pension in a number of 
funds. Doing so is made easy by the single investment-choice 
platform provided on the SPA website.71 Rather than individuals 
having direct relationships with their chosen fund/s, the SPA 
aggregates member transactions and negotiates fees for choice 
products that are substantially lower than if the products were 
offered directly to individuals.72 
  
                                            
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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New  Zealand’s  KiwiSaver
The New Zealand Government introduced an opt-out, defined 
contribution pension scheme called KiwiSaver in 2007. Employers 
must enrol all eligible employees in a suitable pension fund. The 
minimum contribution is 6% of wages.73  Employees may opt out 
of the scheme altogether if they wish. 
Employees are advised of the employer-chosen pension scheme. 
If both employer and employee fail to choose a fund, the 
employee is allocated to one of nine government-chosen default 
funds.74 Default funds are chosen through a government-run 
tender that selects funds on the basis of a range of fund 
characteristics, including fees. The New Zealand Government 
determines the asset allocation of the defaults through a 
consultation process with the industry. Default products must hold 
between 12-25% of their portfolio in growth assets 
If employees wish to exercise choice of fund, they can select from 
a broad range of private options. The government has built a 
comparison website on which funds are categorised so that retail 
account holders can compare them.75 
Annual fees achieved for the default products range from 0.38% 
to 0.65% of funds under management.76  
                                            
73 Government of New Zealand (2012). 
74 Effective 1 July 2014, Government of New Zealand . 
75 Government of New Zealand (2014b) 
76 For a $50,000 account. Fees range from 0.38%-0.99% for an account with a 
$7,000 balance. 
Table 2: New Zealand asset allocation by product (2014) 
Per cent in growth assets 
 
Fund Type 
Defensive Conservative Balanced Growth Aggressive 
0 - 10 10-35 35 - 63 63 - 90 90 - 100 
 
Source: Government of New Zealand (2014b)
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The Chilean defined-contribution system 
Chile introduced a privately provided, mandatory defined-
contribution system in 1980/81. In 2008, after years of high fees, it 
introduced a tender for the right to manage default accounts. The 
tender design and other institutional features are summarised in 
Chapter 4.  
Within the default fund, new members are assigned, based on 
their age, to one of the five investment products offered by the 
default fund. Individuals can change products within a fund and 
they are also free to switch to one of the non-default private 
providers after a period of time. 
Funds can only offer five products that must adhere to asset 
allocation rules. Table 3 shows maximum investment limits by 
asset class for each of the five product types in the Chilean 
system. As well as maximum investment limits, the Chilean 
system has minimum investment limits, offshore investment limits 
and other limits for its differing risk-return categories (see footnote 
for further details).77  
Annual fees for the default product are equivalent to 0.2 per cent 
of funds under management per year.78 
 
                                            
77 Hormazába (2010). 
78 Effective August 2014. Conversion of contribution fees to annual fees 
assumes wage growth of 1.8 per cent, 40 year contribution period, and 5 per 
cent real returns. 
 
Table 3: Chilean product asset allocation maximum limits (2010) 
Maximum investment per asset class, per cent 
  
Fund Type 
Maximum allocation   A B C D E 
Government securities 
 
40 40 50 70 80 
Term deposits, bonds and other 
securities representing issues by 
financial institutions  
 
40 40 50 70 80 
Securities guaranteed by financial 
institutions 
 
40 40 50 70 80 
Letters of credit issued by financial 
institutions 
 
40 40 50 60 70 
Public and private corporate bonds 
 
30 30 40 50 60 
Public and private corporate 
convertible bonds 
 
30 30 10 5 - 
Shares in publicly traded 
corporations and publicly traded 
real-estate corporations  
 
60 50 30 15 - 
Other* 
 
3 3 1 1 - 
Units in domestic investment funds 
and mutual funds 
 
40 30 20 10 - 
Commercial paper issued by 
companies with a maturity of no 
more than one year, non-renewable 
 
10 10 10 20 30 
Investment in foreign currency 
without hedging   
40 25 20 15 10 
 
Note: Fund type A is the most risky and, fund type E the least risky. 
Source: Hormazába (2010). 
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